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THE INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS: RISKS, LIABILITIES, AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES
I.

THE “INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS”: BACKGROUND

The industrial Internet of Things (“IoT”) has the promise to revolutionize the
industrial sector in the United States and around the world. While much of the focus
has been on the consumer IoT,1 the industrial IoT is estimated to grow close to 100
billion connected devices in the next five years and will likely outpace the consumer
IoT due to the large-scale nature of the industrial products sector.2 Almost every
industrial sector has the ability to leverage sensors and other technologies to generate
insight from industrial equipment by collecting and analyzing data in real time.3 The
industrial IoT is expected to have a transformational effect on the industrial sector by
changing the way industries innovate, collaborate, and create new efficiencies by
leveraging big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and virtual collaboration to
derive business insight.
The industrial IoT, sometimes called the Industrial Internet or Industry 4.0,4
refers to the digital transformation of the industrial sector.5 Though there is no
universal definition of the industrial IoT, it generally refers to the proliferation of
industrial systems, machines, and devices capable of interacting with the physical
environment, people, and other devices.6 Electronic sensors,7 industrial internet
1.

The consumer Internet of Things refers to everyday consumer products embedded with technology that
enables those products to interact with the physical environment, people, and other devices. Mauricio
Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for Businesses, 43 N. Ky. L. Rev. 29,
31–32 (2016).

2.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Industrial Internet of Things 7 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/gx/
en/technology/pdf/industrial-internet-of-things.pdf; see also Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 32–34.

3.

Gen. Elec. Co. & Accenture, Industrial Internet Insights Report 7 (2015) [hereinafter
Industrial Internet Insights Report], https://www.ge.com/digital/sites/default/files/industrialinternet-insights-report.pdf.

4.

See, e.g., About Us, Indus. Internet Consortium, http://www.iiconsortium.org/working-committees.
htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2018); Cornelius Baur & Dominik Wee, Manufacturing’s Next Act, McKinsey
& Company: Insights on Operations (June 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
operations/our-insights/manufacturings-next-act; What is the Industrial Internet of Things?, Gen.
Electric Company, https://www.ge.com/digital/blog/everything-you-need-know-about-industrialinternet-things (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

5.

See generally Brian Hartmann, William P. King, & Subu Narayanan, Digital Manufacturing: The Revolution
Will Be Virtualized, McKinsey & Company: Insights on Operations (Aug. 2015), https://www.
mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/digital-manufacturing-the-revolution-will-bevirtualized (“[T]he explosion in data and new computing capabilities—along with advances in other areas
such as artificial intelligence, automation and robotics, additive technology, and human-machine
interaction—are unleashing innovations that will change the nature of manufacturing itself.”).

6.

See Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 31.

7.

An electronic sensor is a device designed to detect, measure, or respond to an input from the environment
in which it is operating, such as “light, heat, motion, moisture, pressure, or any one of a great number of
other environmental phenomena.” Sensor, TechTarget & WhatIs.com, https://whatis.techtarget.com/
definition/sensor (last updated July 2012); 50 Sensor Applications for a Smarter World, Libelium, http://
www.libelium.com/resources/top_50_iot_sensor_applications_ranking/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (listing
various smart devices that interact with the physical environment to, for example, detect air pollution,
measure water pressure, and help predict forest fires).
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software, or other embedded technologies8 generate and transmit data from these
devices over an internet-connected network.9 Companies can then analyze the data,
which is often stored in cloud applications, to guide decision-making, improve safety
and organizational processes, reduce waste, promote efficiency, and lessen
environmental impact.10
There is enormous potential for growth in almost all industries through
development of industrial IoT applications, as almost anything can be made into an
intelligent machine.11 The industrial IoT has already been leveraged in a range of
asset-heavy industries, including manufacturing, logistics, mining, oil and gas,
utilities, and agriculture.12 Data generated by industrial equipment holds enormous
business value.13 For example, attaching sensors to the machinery on a factory floor
generates data about inventory flows, production levels, and machinery performance,
which allows a company to optimize factory operations by adjusting machinery and
operational decisions as needed in response to the data.14 In the transportation sector,
sensors attached to trucks can “collect data on fuel consumption, tire pressure,
temperature, speed and location.”15 The industrial IoT is having a profound impact
on the oil and gas industry, which has incorporated some of the most advanced
applications of the industrial IoT to date.16 Unlike the manufacturing industry, where
processes are performed in the closed setting of a factory, the outdoor operating
environment in the oil and gas industry presents additional challenges to productivity,
reliability of equipment, predictability of working conditions, complexity of supply
chains, and maintenance of asset integrity.17 To address these challenges, new
8.

An embedded computer technology is a “special-purpose system in which the computer is completely
encapsulated by the device it controls.” Dep’t of Elec. & Comput. Eng’g, Embedded Computer Systems,
N.C. St. U., https://www.ece.ncsu.edu/research/cas/ecs (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

9.

Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 31.

10.

Id.

11.

Paul Daugherty et al., Accenture, Driving Unconventional Growth Through the
Industrial Internet of Things 11 (2015), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/
next-gen/reassembling-industry/pdf/Accenture-Driving-Unconventional-Growth-through-IIoT.pdf.

12.

The Industrial IoT: 125+ Startups Transforming Factory Floors, Oil Fields, and Supply Chains, CB Insights:
Research (May 5, 2017), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/top-startups-iiot/ [hereinafter CB
Insights].

13.

Id.; e.g., Bhoopathi Rapolu, Internet of Aircraft Things: An Industry Set to Be Transformed, Aviation Wk.
Network (Jan. 18, 2016), http://aviationweek.com/connected-aerospace/internet-aircraft-thingsindustry-set-be-transformed (discussing the immense business value the industrial IoT is expected to
have in the aircraft industry).

14.

James Manyika et al., McKinsey Glob. Inst., The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value
Beyond the Hype 66 (2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/ourinsights/the-internet-of-things-the-value-of-digitizing-the-physical-world (follow “Full Report (PDF–
3MB)”).

15.

Daugherty et al., supra note 11, at 8.

16.

Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 74.

17.

Id.
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production platforms in the oil and gas industry have up to thirty thousand sensors
to generate real-time data and adjust production strategy.18
The industrial IoT enables industrial companies to improve operational efficiency
and optimize assets and operations, and ultimately may affect profitability and alter the
competitive landscape.19 Even a small increase in productivity could generate billions of
dollars a year.20 Failure to embrace the industrial IoT may mean the failure of an
industrial company to remain competitive in the future.21 Conservative estimates place
the expected global economic impact of the industrial IoT at $500 billion of GDP by
2020.22 Other estimates of the industrial IoT’s value reach up to $15 trillion of global
GDP by 2030.23 To capture this full economic value, there will need to be innovation
in organizational management, business models, and technical standards,24 all of which
will present risks, potential liabilities, and emerging legal issues. Part II of this article
discusses the cybersecurity risks inherent in the industrial IoT, related liabilities, and
potential approaches to mitigate these risks. Part III discusses the need to obtain
intellectual property protection and the obstacles faced when doing so. Part IV
addresses the technical and legal challenges to achieving the degree of interoperability
necessary for the industrial IoT to achieve its full potential, as well as potential licensing
solutions. Part V focuses on the legal challenges and risks arising in certain industrial
sectors with early adoption of the industrial IoT. Part VI addresses the aggressive data
protection regime emerging in the European Union and the regulatory compliance
implications for industrial IoT companies. Part VII concludes this article.
II. SECURITY RISKS PRESENT POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITIES

Greater connectivity of operational technology exposes a company’s operations to
security risks.25 Cyberattacks against industrial companies have increased in recent years,
18.

Id.; see also Riccardo Bertocco & Vishy Padmanabhan, Bain & Co., Big Data Analytics in Oil
and Gas 1 (2014), http://www.bain.com/Images/BAIN_BRIEF_Big_Data_analytics_in_oil_and_gas.
pdf (discussing the benefits of utilizing big data analytics generated by sensors in the oil and gas industry).

19.

Industrial Internet Insights Report, supra note 3, at 10.

20. Daugherty et al., supra note 11, at 4.
21.

See European Comm’n, Communication from the Commission on Standard Essential Patents for a European
Digitalised Economy, at 1, Ref. Ares (2017)1906931 (Oct. 4, 2017) [hereinafter EC Roadmap], https://
ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-1906931_en (follow “Download”); see also
Matt Loeb, Internet of Things Security Issues Require a Rethink on Risk Management, Wall Street J.:
CIO J. (Oct 14, 2015, 12:32 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/10/14/internet-of-things-securityissues-require-a-rethink-on-risk-management/ (arguing that the benefit of embracing the IoT outweighs
security risks that come along with it).

22.

Daugherty et al., supra note 11, at 4.

23.

Id.

24.

Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 2.

25.

Ivan Fernandez, Frost & Sullivan & Schneider Elec., Cybersecurity for Industrial
Automation & Control Environments 3 (2013), https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_
enDocType=White+Paper&p_File_Id=1165513224&p_File_Name=998-2095-04-13-13AR0_EN.
PDF&p_Reference=998-2095-04-13-13AR0_EN; Rene Millman, Cybersecurity Attacks on IIoT

220

VOLUME 62 | 2017/18

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

and the incidence of malicious attacks is expected to rise in the future.26 Cyberattacks
on industrial control systems in particular are a significant challenge for industrial
companies and occur with increasing frequency.27 Attacks on a control system can
disrupt industrial activity on a large scale because the control system is the nerve center
of an industrial environment.28 A cyberattack on a control system even has the potential
to cause physical damage to an industrial system.29 For example, in 2014, a cyberattack
against a German steel mill caused significant physical damage to the mill when hackers
took over the control system and prevented a blast furnace from shutting down.30
A. Security Vulnerabilities of Industrial IoT Technologies Are Unique.

The unique characteristics of the industrial IoT heightens the security challenges
of digitizing an industrial environment. The sheer number of industrial IoT
technologies required to digitize an industrial system itself creates a security
challenge.31 With thousands of sensors and other connected technologies deployed in
an industrial environment, there are numerous access points for an outside actor to
exploit.32 The more digitalization there is in an industrial environment, the greater
the risk of exposure to cyberattacks.33
Infrastructure Expected to Increase This Year, Internet Bus. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://internetof business.
com/cybersecurity-iiot-infrastructure/.
26. See Steve Morgan, The Top 5 Industries at Risk of Cyber-Attacks (May 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.

com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/05/13/list-of-the-5-most-cyber-attacked-industries/#71d26b41715e.
According to a recent survey of IT security professionals worldwide, ninety-six percent of respondents
expect to see an increase in security attacks on industrial IoT infrastructure, but over half of respondents
report that they are not prepared for malicious attacks targeting industrial IoT systems. Ray Lapena,
More than 90% of IT Pros Expect More Attacks, Risk, and Vulnerability with Industrial IoT in 2017,
Tripwire: St. Security (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/featured/90pros-expect-attacks-risk-vulnerability-iiot-2017/.

27.

Warwick Ashford, Industrial Control Systems: What Are the Security Challenges?, ComputerWeekly.com
(Oct. 14, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240232680/Industrial-controlsystems-What-are-the-security-challenges.

28. See Joseph Abrenio et al., Cyber Security and the Grid: We’ll Leave the Lights On For You (If We Can), 33

Syracuse J. Sci. & Tech. L. 3, 11 (2017).

29. See Cyberattack on a German Steel-Mill, Sentryo (May 31, 2017), https://www.sentryo.net/cyberattack-

on-a-german-steel-mill/; Kim Zetter, A Cyberattack Has Caused Confirmed Physical Damage for the Second
Time Ever, Wired (Jan. 8, 2015, 5:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hackdestruction/.

30. Cyberattack on a German Steel-Mill, supra note 29; Zetter, supra note 29. The hackers first gained access to

the office software network of the industrial site and from there were able to penetrate the production
management software for the mill. Cyberattack on a German Steel-Mill, supra note 29; Zetter, supra note 29.

31.

See Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace Sector,
10 Fla. Int’l U. L. Rev. 635, 640–41 (2015).

32.

Id.; Karen Rose et al., Internet Soc’y, The Internet of Things: An Overview 32 (2015),
https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ISOC-IoT-Overview-20151221-en.pdf.

33.

Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31, at 640–41.
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Furthermore, connected technologies often have no clear way to alert a user
when there is a security breach, which may allow a breach to continue for a long
period without detection.34 The risk is greater with the industrial IoT because there
are simply more opportunities to exploit security vulnerabilities in an industrial
environment, which deploys hundreds of connected technologies that a company
could not possibly monitor on a constant basis.35 We have already seen an example of
the potentially widespread reach of a cyberattack targeting connected devices. In
September 2016, a type of malware called Mirai began infecting IoT devices,
enabling cybercriminals to control the devices remotely and conduct distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks by flooding internet servers with malicious traffic
to shut them down.36 This malware affected hundreds of thousands of IoT devices in
numerous countries.37 Mirai was difficult to contain because users did not detect its
presence when the malware did not noticeably affect performance of the devices. 38
Interoperability expands the potential scope of a data breach. 39 An open and
connected industrial environment means that malware or another security weakness
in one device could spread quickly to other connected devices in the same network
and impact the entire industrial system.40 The seamless communication and
processing of information through sensors, transmitters, and other industrial IoT
technologies by nature increases the risk of spreading the damage from cyberattacks.41
Compounding the security challenge is that an industrial system tends to deploy
identical devices.42 While this homogeneity may improve interconnectedness, a
single security vulnerability could have an outsized impact on an industrial system
deploying other devices with similar design characteristics.43 If hackers figure out
how to breach the features of one device, there may be hundreds or thousands of
34. Rose et al., supra note 32, at 35.
35.

See Lily Hay Newman, The Botnet that Broke the Internet Isn’t Going Away, Wired (Dec. 9, 2016, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isnt-going-away/.

36. Id.
37.

Jason Christman, How the Industrial Internet of Things Impacts Data and Privacy, Honeywell, https://
www.honeywell.com/newsroom/news/2017/01/how-the-industrial-internet-of-things-impacts-dataand-privacy (last updated Jan. 27, 2017).

38. Newman, supra note 35.
39.

Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105.

40. See Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31, at 640–41; Fernandez, supra note 25, at 3.
41.

Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31, at 640; Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105.

42.

Rose et al., supra note 32, at 34.

43.

Id. (“For example, a communication protocol vulnerability of one company’s brand of Internet-enabled
light bulbs might extend to every make and model of device that uses that same protocol or which shares
key design or manufacturing characteristics.”); see, e.g., Liam O Murchu, Stuxnet P2P Component,
Symantec (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-p2p-component
(demonstrating how malware is easily transmitted between connected devices); Kim Zetter, How Digital
Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, Wired (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/ (discussing how the
Stuxnet malware targeted and disabled thousands of centrifuges at a nuclear facility in Iran).
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identical devices deployed throughout an industrial system that could become
vulnerable to unauthorized access.44 The danger of homogeneity is even greater when
identical devices are used in operations at multiple locations.45 Once hackers have
determined how to access industrial IoT technologies in one location, they can breach
identical technologies in other locations.46
When industrial IoT devices are accessible outside of a protected environment,
the risks are even higher. While some industries may be able to deploy industrial IoT
technologies in a controlled environment, such as a manufacturing plant, other
industries must use them in an open environment where they have less ability to
monitor conditions.47 For example, sensors could be attached to trucks to monitor for
repairs, water meters to monitor water usage levels, or oil wells to measure
temperature, pressure, and oil extraction rates.48 The location of these technologies
in an open industrial environment makes physical security difficult, exposing these
technologies to unauthorized physical access and tampering.49
Yet another security challenge particular to the industrial IoT is the enormous
amount of data stored in one place. The hundreds or thousands of connected
technologies deployed across an industrial system can generate massive streams of
data.50 But collecting the data is only part of the promise of the industrial IoT. To
create value for industries, this data must be stored and analyzed, and often it is
stored in cloud platforms.51 While the decreasing cost of cloud storage is enabling a
wider range of industrial IoT applications,52 storing valuable commercial data in the
cloud makes an attractive target for cybercriminals or competitors looking to access
sensitive or proprietary industrial data.53
44. Richard Kam, Time to Get Security Smart About the Internet of Things, IAPP: Privacy Advisor (Nov.

24, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/time-to-get-security-smart-about-the-internet-of-things/.

45.

See Mission Support Ctr., Idaho Nat’l Lab., Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of
the U.S. Electric Sector 24–25 (2016) [hereinafter Mission Support Center Analysis Report],
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Cyber%20Threat%20and%20Vulnerability%20
Analysis%20of%20the%20U.S.%20Electric%20Sector.pdf (“[I]f more than one plant uses the same
configuration of equipment and with the same access controls, all plants are at risk if a cyber attacker
discovers a way to compromise the equipment.”).

46. Id.
47.

See Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 74.

48. Id.
49. Rose et al., supra note 32, at 34.
50. Daugherty et al., supra note 11 (explaining that General Electric’s latest locomotive has 250 sensors

that generate 150,000 data points per minute).

51.

Rose et al., supra note 32, at 23; see also Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 17; Gen. Elec., Predix:
The Industrial Internet Platform 6 (2016), https://www.ge.com/uk/sites/www.ge.com.uk/files/
Predix-The-Industrial-Internet-Platform-Brief.pdf.

52.

Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 17.

53.

Thomas Barrabi, Why Hackers Love the Cloud, Fox Bus. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/
features/2016/12/16/why-hackers-love-cloud.html; Scott Nonaka & Kevin Rubino, Contracting in the
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The prevalence of legacy systems in an industrial environment creates yet another
security challenge. Many companies keep older, or “legacy,” industrial equipment in
use for decades so as long as those items continue to function because replacing or
upgrading equipment can be costly and disruptive.54 For this reason, companies tend
to layer industrial IoT applications on top of their existing legacy systems rather than
replace them.55 As a result, an industrial environment may have both new technology
and legacy machines, and industrial IoT technologies need to find a way to connect
across them all.56 These legacy systems are harder to secure because they often have
limited or no security built into them57 and are not designed for connectivity.58
Exploitation of the industrial IoT’s security challenges could have potentially
devastating consequences. On one end of the spectrum, a cyberattack or nonmalicious malfunction in a connected system could cause business disruptions
because a delay to even one part of a connected system can impact performance in
another part.59 A business disruption may only affect a single company, or it could
cause large-scale economic harm if it impacts critical infrastructure.60
The consequences of a malfunction or cyberattack on a connected system could
transcend mere business disruption. Industrial IoT technologies are used to manage
critical systems in sensitive industries—including the management of power grids,
water treatment plants, chemical facilities, hospitals, and financial networks 61—
which multiplies the security risks because a disturbance has the potential to disrupt
Cloud: Who Pays for a Data Breach?, Bloomberg BNA (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.bna.com/
contracting-cloud-pays-n57982078761/.
54. Rose et al., supra note 32, at 49; Ashford, supra note 27; Bernard Marr, Unlocking the Value of the

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and Big Data in Manufacturing, Forbes (April 21, 2017, 12:35 AM),
https://w w w.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/04/21/unlocking-the-value-of-the-industrialinternet-of-things-iiot-and-big-data-in-manufacturing-2/#66ebeb176861.

55.

Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 46.

56. See Marr, supra note 54.
57.

Daugherty et al., supra note 11, at 13.

58. Ashford, supra note 27.
59.

Nick Kostov & Costas Paris, Companies Try to Contain Fallout from Global Cyberattack, Wall Street J.
(June 28, 2017, 5:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fallout-from-global-cyberattack-extends-intosecond-day-1498639146.

60. Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105. For example, a software bug in the North American electric

grid in 2003 led to widespread electrical power outages that disrupted businesses, utilities, transportation,
and cell phone service for two days in several northeastern and midwestern states and parts of Canada.
James Barron, The Blackout of 2003: The Overview; Power Surge Blacks Out Northeast, Hitting Cities in 8
States and Canada; Midday Shutdowns Disrupt Millions, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/08/15/nyregion/blackout-2003-overview-power-surge-blacks-northeast-hittingcities-8-states.html; Hugh Byrd and Steve Matthewman, Lights Out: The Dark Future of Electric Power,
New Scientist (May 7, 2014), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22229684-300-lights-outthe-dark-future-of-electric-power/; see generally N. Am. Elec. Reliability Council, Technical
Analysis of the August 14, 2003 Blackout (2004), http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/
NERC_Final_Blackout_Report_07_13_04.pdf.

61.

Zetter, supra note 29.
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critical services to citizens.62 Interference with industrial IoT technologies that
manage the physical world, such as the breach of a water system, hospital equipment,
chemical facility, or other regulated utility, could place public health and safety at
risk when those technologies are directed to behave in unpredictable or undesirable
ways.63 For example, in 2016, hackers reportedly gained access to the control system
at a water utility and changed the levels of chemicals used to treat tap water by
manipulating the valves controlling the flow of the chemicals.64
B. Legal Exposure from Cybersecurity Incidents

The challenge of securing a vast and integrated industrial system presents
potential liability risks. In the event of a data breach, an industrial company could
face one or more of the following: potential litigation, contractual liability, and
regulatory enforcement. The steps a company takes to address security concerns
before an incident occurs could impact the scope of the company’s liability. Industrial
companies must address security vulnerabilities even though guidance, standards,
and case law surrounding data security liabilities are still developing.
Companies may face litigation risk related to their security practices in the event
of a data breach. Litigants have tried a variety of claims, with mixed success, to recover
losses arising from data breaches.65 Negligence claims in particular present a risk of
liability because some plaintiffs have been successful in stating a claim for negligence
and surviving a motion to dismiss.66 Some courts have recognized a duty to exercise
reasonable care in safeguarding certain categories of data,67 though this is a developing
62. Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105. For example, in December 2015, hackers gained control of a power

grid in Ukraine and remotely opened circuit breakers, causing swift and widespread power outages for up
to 230,000 citizens. Andrew Roth, Not Just the DNC: Five More Hacks the West Has Tied to Russia, Wash.
Post (June 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/15/not-just-thednc-five-more-hacks-the-west-has-tied-to-russia/?utm_term=.5731e95bb427.

63. See Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105; Zetter, supra note 29.
64. John Leyden, Water Treatment Plant Hacked, Chemical Mix Changed for Tap Supplies, Register (Mar. 24,

2016, 12:19 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/24/water_utility_hacked/; Eduard Kovaks,
Attackers Alter Water Treatment Systems in Utility Hack: Report (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.
securityweek.com/attackers-alter-water-treatment-systems-utility-hack-report. The operational
technology at the utility reportedly ran on an outdated system, highlighting the problem that critical
infrastructure often relies on legacy systems that are less secure and at higher risk. See Kovaks, supra;
Daugherty et al., supra note 11, at 13.

65.

These claims include breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and deceptive acts and practices.
E.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D. Tex.
2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N. Am. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d
421 (5th Cir. 2013).

66. E.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1309–10 (D. Minn.

2014) (finding that financial institutions that issued credit or debit cards affected by a breach of a
retailer’s systems adequately pleaded a claim for negligence). Negligence law imposes a duty of reasonable
care when a defendant’s conduct creates a foreseeable risk of injury. Id. at 1308.

67.

Id. at 1309–10 (applying Minnesota law, which recognizes a duty of reasonable care to protect the
security of financial data); Lone Star Nat’l Bank, 729 F.3d at 426 (applying New Jersey law); In re: The
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area of negligence law and not every court recognizes it under its state’s common
law.68 Furthermore, what is considered “foreseeable” in data breach litigation is still
being defined through case law and regulatory guidance, though it appears to include
at least those risks that can be identified through readily available measures69 or risks
that a company knew about but failed to take reasonable security measures to address.70
Contractual allocation of the liabilities and costs of responding to a cybersecurity
breach in contracts is paramount. Industrial IoT companies often rely on the services
of third-party providers, particularly third-party platform or cloud service providers
who may store the massive amount of data generated from industrial IoT
technologies.71 If the third party experiences a data breach, the allocation of expenses
associated with mitigation, data recovery, customer notification, and potential
litigation may depend on the terms of the services contract with the third party.72
Companies may want to add specific provisions to their contracts assigning
responsibility for data breach costs and related litigation expenses, maintaining
cybersecurity insurance, setting an appropriate liability cap, or creating a carveout in
liability waivers for potential lost profits.73
A company may reduce its potential liability for security risks, especially in the
face of negligence claims or a regulatory investigation, if it implements appropriate
measures up front. There are three approaches a company may consider to reduce
potential liability in the event of a cybersecurity incident: implementing (1) riskbased security measures, (2) security by design, or (3) security measures based on
industry sector standards and guidelines.
Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 2583 1:14-md-2583-TWT, 2016 WL
2897520, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016) (applying Georgia law).
68. See USAA Fed. Savings Bank v. PLS Fin. Services, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 965, 969–70, 970 n.4 (N.D.

Ill. 2017) (refusing to recognize a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding financial information
under Illinois law).

69. See FTC Files Complaint Against LabMD for Failing to Protect Consumers’ Privacy, Fed. Trade

Commission (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/ftc-filescomplaint-against-labmd-failing-protect-consumers.

70. Home Depot, 2016 WL 2897520, at *4.
71.

See Nonaka & Rubino, supra note 53.

72. See id. A company may not receive compensation for these expenses if its contracts with third parties

limit or waive indirect, special, exemplary, incidental, or consequential damages or lost profits. See
Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Tech., Inc., 641 Fed. Appx. 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that
a company will not have the right to consequential damages when they are waived in a contract or
license agreement). In Heartland Payment Systems, banks sued to recover costs they incurred when a
company that processed credit card information for the banks experienced a data breach in which
hackers stole the credit card information. 834 F. Supp. 2d at 575. The court found that the banks could
not recover consequential damages from the payment processor under a breach of contract claim, given
that their contract limited this remedy to willful breaches and there was insufficient evidence that the
contract breach at issue was willful. Id. at 580. Courts do not always agree on what constitutes
consequential versus direct damages, so companies should consider negotiating in advance as to which
party will be responsible for data breach costs. See Colin Quinn & Brendan Quinn, Awarding Damages
for a Breach of Contract: Direct or Consequential?, J. Kan. B. Ass’n, Oct. 2017, at 21.

73. Nonaka & Rubino, supra note 53.
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Adopting a risk-based approach to cybersecurity allows a company to demonstrate
that it took measures appropriate to the risk faced and reduced potential liability
down the road. Some regulators recommend that companies prioritize their security
measures based on commonly known or reasonably foreseeable risks,74 as there is a
spectrum of security risks in an industrial environment, and it may be impossible to
address all risks lurking in a connected environment.75 Even attempting to address
all risks may result in a frustrating game of cat and mouse, continually responding to
new security threats.76 Instead, a company should conduct an assessment of the risks
it actually faces in its industrial environment and tailor its security measures
accordingly.77 Potential risk factors include the size of the company, the number of
known risks present in the industrial environment, the criticality of the services the
company provides, the size of the potential damage from an attack, the likelihood of
an attack occurring, and the economic cost to mitigate an attack.78 The company
should weigh these risk factors against the amount of time, cost, and resources
needed to implement security measures to address the threats.79
Another approach to reducing potential liabilities is to adopt “security by design”
by taking into account security at the outset of designing an industrial IoT system.
This would involve companies conducting a risk assessment and incorporating security
measures to address those risks before operationalizing equipment with IoT
technologies.80 Some regulators have issued guidance recommending that companies
incorporate security by design into the IoT, including the Department of Homeland

74.

Many states have data security laws requiring companies handling personal information to develop a
comprehensive information security program containing administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards appropriate to the size, scope, and type of business, the amount of resources available to the
company, the amount of stored data, and the need for security and confidentiality of the information.
See, e.g., Cal Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 (West 2018); Md. Code Ann. Com. Law § 14-3503 (West 2018);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.622 (2018); 201 Mass. Code Regs. 17.03 (2018). Non-binding federal
guidelines similarly recommend the implementation of reasonable administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards, particularly to address commonly known or reasonably foreseeable risks. See
generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Personal Information (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf (providing
guidelines to businesses on how to protect their customers’ sensitive information).

75. See Rose et al., supra note 32, at 33 (“In an endless cat-and-mouse game, new security threats evolve,

and device manufacturers and network operators continuously respond to address the new threats.”).

76. Id.
77.

See id.

78. See id.
79. Id. At a minimum, a company should aim to adopt any measures that are relatively inexpensive and not

disruptive to the business to implement. See id. at 33–35 (discussing the importance of security in IoT
devices).

80. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected

World (2015) [hereinafter FTC IoT Guidance], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
federa l-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-thingsprivacy/150127iotrpt.pdf (encouraging companies to “build security into their devices at the outset”).
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Security,81 Federal Trade Commission,82 and National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.83
Companies may reduce their exposure to liability by relying on relevant security
standards when selecting security measures. In tort law, courts have traditionally
examined industry customs or standards to determine best practices, and a company’s
compliance with those standards may present strong evidence weighing against
negligence.84 The standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), now part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, apply across industries,85
and some regulators encourage companies to implement NIST standards.86 Industryspecific standards are also important to consider.87
81.

The Department of Homeland Security wants companies to prioritize security in the IoT at the design
phase to reduce the risk of disruptions to critical infrastructure and avoid the more difficult and
expensive process of adding security to IoT technologies after they have been deployed. U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Sec., Strategic Principles for Securing the Internet of Things (IoT) 2, 5 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_
of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL....pdf.

82. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been a vocal proponent of adopting security by design,

urging companies for years not to leave security as an afterthought in developing IoT technologies. FTC
IoT Guidance, supra, note 80, at 28. Though the FTC gives companies the flexibility to implement
context-specific security measures rather than prescribing specific measures, it recommends greater
security measures for IoT technologies that collect sensitive information, present physical security or
safety risks, or connect to other devices or networks. Id. at 33.

83. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) encourages vehicle and equipment

manufacturers and suppliers to address cybersecurity risks throughout the entire life cycle of the vehicle,
including the conception, design, and manufacturing phases, not just the use and maintenance phases,
with the goal of designing products free of unreasonable safety risks stemming from cybersecurity
threats and vulnerabilities. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Cybersecurity Best
Practices for Modern Vehicles 12 (2016) [hereinafter NHTSA Guidance].

84. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 Berkeley

Tech. L.J. 1553, 1587–88 (2005).

85. About NIST, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last updated June 14, 2017) (explaining NIST’s role

as a physical science laboratory providing expertise, measurements, and standards for U.S. industries).

86. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 14

(2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm482022.pdf. For example, the FDA recommends that manufacturers seeking approval of medical
devices apply the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (“the Framework”)
in developing and implementing a cybersecurity program. Id. The Framework is a set of standards and best
practices developed through a collaboration between the government and the private sector to help
organizations manage cybersecurity risks. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Technology 1 (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.

87.

NHTSA encourages vehicle and equipment manufacturers to implement the SAE J3061 standard,
called the Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems, which vehicle and equipment
manufacturers published in January 2016 to recommend best practices and promote a life-cycle approach
to address cybersecurity risks in vehicles. NHTSA Guidance, supra note 83; Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems J3061, SAE Int’l (Jan. 17, 2012), http://standards.sae.org/wip/j3061/.
SAE International (“SAE”) is a professional association of “scientists, engineers, and practitioners that
advances self-propelled vehicle and system knowledge” through the development of voluntary consensus
standards. About SAE International, SAE Int’l, https://www.sae.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
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A company may want to consider whether to participate in the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) as part of its cybersecurity defense
strategy.88 CISA permits companies to conduct defensive measures, share cyber
threat indicators with the federal government or other companies, and receive
information from the federal government about cyber indicators.89 In return, the
company would receive protection from liability for the information it shares with
the federal government.90 However, this liability protection applies only if the
company monitors information systems or shares cyber threat indicators in accordance
with the procedures provided in CISA.91 If a company complies in good faith with
the reporting procedures but commits a technical violation, it may not benefit from
the liability protection.92 If a company decides to participate in CISA, it should keep
careful records documenting its compliance.93 Furthermore, liability protection
appears to apply only to liability arising from the sharing of cyber threat indicators,94
so a company could still face potential liability for other conduct, such as failing to
take reasonable steps to protect against foreseeable risks prior to a data breach. This
uncertainty about the scope of liability protections and other legal issues may explain
why few companies have chosen to make use of CISA since it was enacted.95
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION

Companies have an incentive to seek intellectual property protection for the
industrial IoT technologies they develop, given the efficiencies and competitive
advantages these technologies may afford them. Intellectual property protection
could help companies defend their proprietary technologies and establish legal
ownership of early IoT innovations as the IoT space becomes more crowded.96
Applications for intellectual property protection related to the IoT have risen sharply
88. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2012).
89. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1502–03; U.S. Comp. Emergency Readiness Team, Cybersecurity Information

Sharing Act—Frequently Asked Questions (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/
ais_files/CISA_FAQs.pdf.

90. 6 U.S.C. § 1505 (“No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity,

and such action shall be promptly dismissed . . . .”).

91.

Id.

92.

See John Evangelakos & Brent J. McIntosh, A Guide to the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Law360 (Jan. 12,
2016, 11:57 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/745523/a-guide-to-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015.

93.

Id.

94. 6 U.S.C. § 1507(k)(1) (“This subchapter supersedes any statute or other provision of law of a State . . .

that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under this subchapter.” (emphasis
added)).

95. See Robert Lemos, Cyber-Threat Data Sharing Off to Slow Start Despite U.S. Legislation, eWeek (Oct. 2,

2016), http://www.eweek.com/security/cyber-threat-data-sharing-off-to-slow-start-despite-u.s.-legislation.

96. See Charles E. Root Jr. & Nancy Edwards Cronin, The Internet of Things and Intellectual Property: Who

Owns the Data?, ipCapital Group (May 17, 2016, 1:48 PM), http://www.ipcg.com/?file=The_
Internet_of_Things_and_Intellectual_Property:_Who_Owns_the_Data.
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since 2014.97 Larger companies in particular have been actively seeking intellectual
property protection.98 Yet it remains unclear the extent to which companies will be
able to obtain intellectual property protection, especially patents, for their industrial
IoT technologies.99 IoT technologies consist of the physical hardware, sensors, and
devices, as well as more abstract technologies such as software, cloud services,
network connectivity, and communications protocols.100 Recent legal developments
may make it harder for companies to obtain intellectual property protection for
claims directed to the more abstract technologies.101
Software is a critical component of industrial IoT technology, but in 2014, the
Supreme Court limited software patent eligibility. In Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank
International, the Supreme Court held that generic computer implementation of an
abstract idea is not sufficient to constitute a patent-eligible invention.102 A claim
directed to an abstract idea generally is excluded from patent eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and can be patented only if there are additional elements that “transform
the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.”103 In other words, there
must be an “inventive concept.”104
Post-Alice, there is a question of which software claims may be patent-eligible.
While Alice has reduced patent eligibility for many software claims,105 courts have
deemed some software claims patent-eligible in the last two years.106 These cases
may show promising signs for the patent eligibility of software and computer
technology critical to the industrial IoT. In Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, the
97.

Charles E. Root Jr. & Nancy Edwards Cronin, The Internet of Things (IoT) and Implications for Intellectual
Property Part III: Alexa Today, Where Tomorrow?, ipCapital Group (Jan. 20, 2017, 8:07 PM), http://
www.ipcg.com/?file=The_Internet_of_Things_and_Implications_for_Intellectual_Property_Alexa_
today_where_tomorrow.

98. Root & Cronin, supra note 96.
99. See infra notes 102–113 and accompanying text.
100. Charles E. Root Jr. & Nancy Edwards Cronin, The Internet of Things (IoT) and Implications for Intellectual

Property Part One of Three: The Far-Reaching Landscape of IoT, ipCapital Group (Feb. 18, 2016, 4:07
PM), http://www.ipcg.com/?file=The_Internet_of_Things_Part_One; IoT Technology Guidebook,
Postscapes, https://www.postscapes.com/internet-of-things-technologies/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2018)
(listing examples of IoT technologies).

101. See infra notes 102–113 and accompanying text.
102. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding that trading software utilizing third parties to mitigate risk in financial

transactions was not patentable, as it merely used a generic computer and generic computer functions to
implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement).

103. Id. at 2355 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.

Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012)).

104. Id. at 2350. The patents at issue in Alice involved a computer-implemented scheme directed to the

abstract idea of managing risk in financial transactions, and the Court found that the claims lacked an
inventive concept because they merely amounted to a generic computer implementation of recordkeeping.
Id. at 2352, 2359.

105. Jones Day, Legal Issues Related to the Development of Automated, Autonomous, and

Connected Cars 11 (2017) [hereinafter Jones Day White Paper].

106. See infra notes 107–113 and accompanying text.
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Federal Circuit concluded that “claims directed to improvements in computer-related
technology, including those directed to software,” are not necessarily abstract and
may be patent-eligible.107 When a patent claim is “directed to an improvement to
computer functionality,” rather than merely using a computer as a tool, the claim is
not abstract and therefore is patent-eligible.108 The technology at issue in Enfish was
a self-referential computer database that improved the efficiency and flexibility of
information storage.109 While the district court found that the claimed idea was
simply directed at the abstract idea of storing and organizing information, the Federal
Circuit reversed that decision because the self-referential table improved the
functionality of information storage by storing information “related to each column
in rows of that very same table, such that new columns can be added by creating new
rows in the table.”110
Even for abstract ideas, all may not be lost post-Alice. A company may still be able
to demonstrate that an abstract idea contains an inventive concept, and thus is patenteligible, where the patent claim provides for a specific and discrete way to implement
the abstract idea. In Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the
patent claim was a filtering software at the ISP server level that allowed subscribers to
control websites accessed and information received over the internet; the software
improved on existing filtering tools by allowing the filters to be customized for each
individual user rather than having a universal set of filtering rules.111 While filtering
software is directed to an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded
that the filtering software in Bascom was patent-eligible because it contained an
inventive concept.112 The inventive concept was “the installation of a filtering tool at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features
specific to each end user. This design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a
filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.”113
While it is not clear post-Alice the extent to which companies could obtain a
patent for data analysis software critical to the industrial IoT,114 these cases
demonstrate a potential path forward. Software developed for the industrial IoT is
107. 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office periodically provides

updated guidance on identifying abstract ideas. Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Off., https://w w w.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-mattereligibility (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

108. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
109. Id. at 1333.
110. Id. at 1337–38.
111. 827 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
112. Id. at 1350.
113. Id. This “specific method of filtering [i]nternet content cannot be said . . . to have been conventional or

generic,” and “its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art ways of
filtering such content.” Id.

114. See W. Keith Robinson, Patent Law Challenges for the Internet of Things, 15 Wake Forest J. Bus. &

Intell. Prop. L. 655, 667 (2015).
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generally designed to improve the computing process by enabling machines to
interact with the physical world and store and analyze that information in new ways.
To the extent such software improves computer functionality or advances a
technology, a claim could possibly fit within Enfish’s analysis of patent eligibility. If
a software claim is deemed an abstract idea, it may nevertheless be patent-eligible
along the lines of the Bascom analysis if the claim provides a specific method for
analyzing, storing, or organizing data from the physical world.
IV. INTEROPERABILITY AND LICENSING

The interoperability of technology is necessary to fulfill the industrial IoT’s
promise of a network of sensors and transmitters that communicate and process
information seamlessly.115 In the past, large industrial companies have built their own
industrial IoT platforms using technologies designed to integrate throughout the
industrial system.116 Recently we are seeing more players developing varied industrial
IoT technologies.117 In 2016, there was more than $2.2 billion invested in startups
that focus on industrial digitization by developing sensors, cloud platforms, networking
infrastructure, and machine-learning software.118 Yet having so many proprietary
products may hinder interoperability across models or manufacturers. It is estimated
that forty percent of the IoT’s potential value depends on interoperability,119 but to
create interoperability there must be standardized technology to connect objects and
process information from varying sources. Until a degree of standardization is
achieved, the full potential of these technologies may not be realized.
A challenge to standardization is the potential for an industrial company to risk
infringing third party patents or pay high licensing fees.120 Given the large number
of code and technologies needed to operate the IoT at an industrial level,121 it would
be easy to infringe a third-party patent. One way to address this challenge is by
creating standard essential patents (SEPs) that require a patent holder to offer nonexclusive licenses on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.122
SEPs are patents of core technologies that are essential to comply with an industry
standard.123 This solution has been used in other industries, most notably the

115. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 34.
116. See CB Insights, supra note 12.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 23.
120. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 35.
121. E.g., Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31.
122. See Robin Kester, Note, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impacts, Standardization Problems,

and Legal Considerations, 8 Elon L. Rev. 205, 223 (2016).

123. EC Roadmap, supra note 21, at 1.
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smartphone industry,124 and has been gaining traction as a potential solution in the
IoT area.125
However, it is not clear that using FRAND terms to set licensing deals will be as
successful in the IoT area as it was in the mobile phone industry.126 First, a set of
standards would need to be developed in the IoT space.127 This would not be an easy
task as the standards would need to apply to a wide range of technologies, and there
may be uncoordinated or conflicting strategies among industry coalitions and even
across countries.128 Second, it may be difficult to identify core technologies and
determine which patents are essential.129 In the IoT area, a large number of sensors
and technologies are needed to operate the IoT at an industrial level,130 which makes
identifying those central to a standard more difficult.131 Third, stakeholders may not
agree on what is a fair and reasonable licensing fee.132 Making the task more difficult
still is that there are no widely agreed upon valuation methodologies, and using
different methodologies would harm the predictability of licensing fees.133
Another potential solution to the risk of infringement or high licensing fees is
the creation of patent pools. A patent pool occurs when companies that hold patents
to different components of a particular technology pool their patents and work as one
group to license the technology as a whole.134 The benefit is that if another company
wants to license that technology, it has to negotiate with only the single group, rather
than with each of the entities individually, to set the licensing terms.135 However, the
IoT has a wider “range of industrial stakeholders,” and a large number of sensors and

124. Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 36; A Note on Standard Essential Patents, Clairvolex (Jan. 2017),

https://clairvolex.com/PDFs/January-2017-Mailer.pdf (“Almost all smartphones or tablets that we use
today are protected by one or more SEPs.”).

125. Recently, the European Commission announced its goal to promote the interoperability of IoT through

FRAND to further digital integration within the European Union and maintain global competitiveness.
EC Roadmap, supra note 21.

126. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 36–37.
127. Rose et al., supra note 32, at 7.
128. Id. at 47–49.
129. EC Roadmap, supra note 21, at 2.
130. E.g., Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31.
131. See EC Roadmap, supra note 21, at 2; Patricia Cappyuns & Jozefien Vanherpe, The Scoop from Europe:

Europe Takes on FRAND Licensing—Again, 52 les Nouvelles 122, 124–26 (2017).

132. See Cappyuns & Vanherpe, supra note 131, at 122, 124–26.
133. EC Roadmap, supra note 21, at 2. Recognizing the importance of valuation methodologies, the

European Commission has issued a roadmap outlining a forthcoming initiative to provide guidance on
FRAND and valuation principles. Id. at 3.

134. Freek Vermeulen, Patent Pools: Do They Kill Innovation?, Forbes (Jan. 22, 2013, 4:39 PM), https://

www.forbes.com/sites/freekvermeulen/2013/01/22/patent-pools-do-they-kill-innovation/#d1cdabb58f4d.

135. See id.
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technologies are needed to operate the IoT at an industrial level.136 It is not clear that
the diverse range of stakeholders, with their own set of interests, customers, and
revenue goals, will be able to work together on licensing deals.137
Some degree of standardization may be achieved as more companies rely on open
source technology, which saves those companies valuable time and resources.138
However, use of open source software often requires a license, and the license may be
difficult to administer.139 Users of open source software licenses must provide notice
of their use of the software in accordance with procedures, seek approval to use the
software, and provide assurance that they will comply with the licenses.140 A company
that fails to comply with open source software licenses may be subject to a copyright
infringement or breach of contract lawsuit.141
Interoperability is important to the success of the industrial IoT, but there is no
simple way to achieve it without risking potential legal exposure. It could take years
for standard-setting bodies to develop appropriate standards, but waiting for
coordination of these dispersed efforts could delay the benefits of the industrial IoT.
Industrial companies could face potential patent infringement claims, licensing risk,
and intellectual property litigation as they navigate the fragmented industrial IoT
environment.
V. RISKS AND LIABILITIES BY SECTOR

Certain industries have been early adopters of the industrial IoT and are leading
investment in the technologies and software necessary to implement it.142 The
transportation, health care, and utilities sectors are among those early adopters.143
136. Wireless Watch, Ericsson’s Patent Pool is Far from the New Start the IoT Needs, Register (Oct. 3, 2016,

8:02 AM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/03/ericssons_patent_pool_is_far_from_the_new_
start_the_iot_needs/.

137. Id. Some commentators have criticized patent pools for harming innovation; if the pool decides to

include a component by one company, but not a close substitute by another company, there may be
decline in innovation among companies that exist outside the pool. Vermeulen, supra note 134.

138. Naomi Tajitsu, Toyota Uses Open-Source Software in New Appproach to In-Car Tech, Reuters (May 31,

2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-toyota-tech-idUSKBN18R1CW. In the automotive
industry, Automotive Grade Linux is a collaborative open source platform for connected cars currently
being developed jointly by ten automakers. Id.; see also The Linux Found., About, Automotive Grade
Linux, https://www.automotivelinux.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). A connected car may use over one
hundred million lines of code, and relying on open source code saves an automaker from engaging in the
time-consuming process of coding from the ground up for each car model and enables the company to
focus on customizing applications. Tajitsu, supra.

139. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 13.
140. Id.
141. Id.; e.g., Artifex Software, Inc. v. Hansom, Inc., No. 16-cv-06982-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62815

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (upholding a breach of contract claim alleging breach of an open source
software agreement).

142. Alison DeNisco Rayome, The Five Industries Leading the IoT Revolution, ZDNet (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:36

AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/the-five-industries-leading-the-iot-revolution/.

143. Id.
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These industries provide insight into the legal risks and liabilities likely to come as
more companies incorporate the industrial IoT into their operations.
A. Transportation

Industrial IoT technologies have the capability to significantly transform the way
people travel and to improve public safety,144 but they present manufacturers,
suppliers, and operators with new legal issues, regulatory challenges, and potential
liabilities that are only just starting to be addressed. IoT technologies can apply to all
forms of transportation and traffic infrastructure, though connected vehicles and
airplanes are among the more advanced IoT applications in the transportation
sector.145 A “connected” vehicle or airplane can access the internet, often through a
wireless network, and communicate with the physical environment, infrastructure,
and manufacturers.146 These connected features allow the vehicles and airplanes to
send and receive streams of data through the internet for the purpose of monitoring
wear and tear of parts, navigation, collision avoidance, weather and traffic reports,
entertainment, and emergency notifications.147
A pressing concern for companies is managing the cybersecurity risks associated
with connected transportation technology. The advanced wireless features that make
connected transportation technologies possible also present serious safety risks if
they malfunction or are accessed by hackers. Researchers have demonstrated it is
possible for hackers to obtain functional control over the operation of a vehicle or
airplane through connected technologies.148
144. Franklin Morris, Five Ways IoT Will Change How You Experience Air Travel, IBM: Internet of Things

Blog (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/smart-air-travel/ (“Thanks to
IoT devices and analytics, [we are] poised to see the airline industry move toward greater efficiency and
better customer service.”).

145. Andrew Meola, How the Internet of Things Will Transform Private and Public Transportation, Bus.

Insider (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:11 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-connectedtransportation-2016-10.

146. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 2.
147. Christine Hall, BMW’s Connected-Car Data Platform to Run in IBM’s Cloud, Data Ctr. Knowledge

(June 16, 2017), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2017/06/16/bmws-connected-cardata-platform-to-run-in-ibms-cloud/; Gillian Jenner, How Airlines Are Tapping into the Internet of
Things, Gen. Electric, https://www.ge.com/digital/press-releases/how-airlines-are-tapping-internetthings (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

148. Researchers have demonstrated the ability to remotely shut down engines, disable brakes, control

steering, lock doors, and use turn signals in connected vehicles, or change the position of airplanes.
Public Service Announcement: Motor Vehicles Increasingly Vulnerable to Remote Exploits, Fed. Bureau
Investigation (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160317.aspx; Kim Zetter, Feds Say
that Banned Researcher Commandeered a Plane, Wired (May 15, 2015, 10:14 PM), https://www.wired.
com/2015/05/feds-say-banned-researcher-commandeered-plane/ [hereinafter Researcher Commandeered
a Plane]; see also Chris Valasek & Charlie Miller, IOActive, Remote Exploitation of an
Unaltered Passenger Vehicle (2015), https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Car_
Hacking.pdf (detailing research on the vulnerability of connected automobiles). For example, white hat
hackers conducted a test where they hacked a Jeep Cherokee driving seventy miles per hour in downtown
St. Louis, Missouri and cut the transmission so that the test driver could not accelerate by pressing the
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Federal policy addressing transportation cybersecurity has developed in a
piecemeal fashion, though momentum is building toward improving cybersecurity
efforts. In January 2017, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requiring vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) technology149 in all cars and light trucks.150 To address security concerns, the
proposal would require “firewalls” between V2V modules and other modules
connected to the data system151 and allow for periodic software updates.152 NHTSA
released its latest policy in September 2017 containing Voluntary Guidance for
Automated Driving Systems outlining twelve safety principles, including a
recommendation to minimize safety risks from hacking by following industry best
practices.153 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has begun efforts to
address cybersecurity,154 though the General Accountability Office issued a report to
members of Congress stating that the FAA should develop a more comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity as it transitions to the Next Generation Air Transportation
gas pedal. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, Wired (July
21, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/. A “white
hat” hacker generally refers to security researchers or other hackers who notify a vendor or other
responsible party when they discover a software vulnerability. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are
White Hat, Gray Hat, and Black Hat Hackers?, Wired (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.
com/2016/04/hacker-lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers/. Similarly, a researcher claimed
that he was able to take control of an airplane after hacking the in-flight entertainment system and
caused the engines to climb, resulting in a sideways movement of the plane during flight. Researcher
Commandeered a Plane, supra.
149. With V2V technology, “[c]ars will talk to other cars, exchanging data and alerting drivers to potential

collisions. They’ll talk to sensors on signs on stoplights, bus stops, even ones embedded in the roads to
get traffic updates and rerouting alerts. And they’ll communicate with your house, office, and smart
devices.” Dirk Wollschlaeger, What’s Next? V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) Communication with Connected Cars,
Wired, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/connected-cars/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

150. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; V2V Communications, 82 Fed. Reg. 3854, 3855 (proposed

Jan. 12, 2017) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). The proposal contained V2V communications
performance requirements tied to the dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) protocol, which is
a two way short- to medium-range wireless communications capability that permits high data
transmission critical to safety applications. DSRC: The Future of Safer Driving, U.S. Dep’t Transp.,
https://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/dsrc_factsheet.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). The proposal is facing
resistance from those who believe that 5G networks can better handle V2V communications. John R.
Quain, Cars Will Talk to One Another. Exactly How Is Less Certain., N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/business/cars-v2v-dsrc-communication.html.

151. These “firewalls” are proposed “to help isolate V2V modules [from] being used as a potential conduit

into other vehicle systems.” Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; V2V Communications, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 3856–57.

152. Id. at 3856, 3914–15.
153. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 6.
154. Aliya Sternstein, FAA Working on New Guidelines for Hack-Proof Planes, Nextgov (Mar. 4, 2016), http://

www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/03/faa-has-started-shaping-cybersecurity-regulations/126449/;
Andy Pasztor, FAA Advisory Body Recommends Cybersecurity Measures, Wall Street J., https://www.wsj.
com/articles/faa-advisory-body-recommends-cybersecurity-measures-1474587049 (last updated Sept. 22,
2016, 9:47 PM).
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System, which relies more heavily on integrated information systems and digital
communication methods.155
Use of connected technologies generates intellectual property concerns.
Automated or connected vehicles will require the development of key technologies,
including collision avoidance technologies, digital cameras, Light Detection and
Ranging (LiDAR),156 radar, telecommunications (including DSRC and 5G
capabilities), artificial intelligence, machine learning, sensors, and mesh networking
technology.157 Companies developing these technologies need to protect their
intellectual property rights through trade secrets or patents.158
Although thousands of patents have already been issued to original equipment
manufacturers, suppliers, and technology companies for connected transportation
technology,159 as noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice has thrown into
question the extent to which these patents will be issued given that industrial IoT
technologies are increasingly software-related.160 For example, in 2015, the Federal
Circuit found a patent to screen equipment and vehicle operators for impairment
invalid because the patent’s application lacked details specifying how the screening
system worked or improved results over prior art, and lacked an inventive concept
beyond conventional computer implementation.161 Going forward, companies seeking
patents for transportation technologies should be careful to show how the invention
improves the operation of a computer or advances a technology.162
Alternatively, companies may seek to protect their technologies through trade
secret law.163 The benefits of relying on trade secret law to protect IoT technologies are
that trade secret protection is relatively inexpensive to obtain, it can be established
faster than prosecution of a patent application, it contains no subject matter limitation,
155. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15-370, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs a More

Comprehensive Approach to Address Cybersecurity as Agency Transitions to NextGen 1,
11 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669627.pdf.

156. LiDAR is a remote sensing method used to examine the surface of the Earth. What is LIDAR?, Nat’l

Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html (last updated Oct.
10, 2017).

157. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 11.
161. Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 635 Fed. Appx. 914, 916, 919–20 (Fed.

Cir. 2015).

162. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105.
163. An example is the recently settled lawsuit in which Waymo LLC accused Uber Technologies, Inc. and

other defendants of stealing trade secrets related to LiDAR by hiring a senior Waymo engineer who
downloaded thousands of confidential company documents. Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No.
17-cv-00939-WHA, 2017 WL 3581171, at *1 (N.D. Cal Aug. 18, 2017); Jones Day White Paper, supra
note 105, at 12; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber and Waymo Settle Trade Secrets Suit Over Driverless Cars,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/uber-waymo-lawsuitdriverless.html.
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and can be defined during the course of litigation.164 But trade secrets lack the presumed
validity of a patent, protections can vary by state law, disclosure prevents a company
from obtaining a legal remedy, and providers of funding tend to prefer patents.165
Finally, connected technologies in the transportation sector present potential
litigation risk. Manufacturers could be subject to product liability litigation for
defective product claims in the event of an accident.166 Though there have been few
product liability claims, one closely watched accident involved a Tesla Model S owner
who was killed using the Autopilot feature when his car crashed into a tractor-trailer
that crossed the road in front of the car.167 The accident presented product liability
concerns because the automatic emergency braking system did not provide a warning,
though NHTSA’s initial investigation did not find any defects in the “Autopilot” or
braking systems.168 However, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a new
finding on September 12, 2017 indicating that the crash may have been caused by
the truck driver’s failure to yield and the Tesla driver’s inattention due to overreliance
on vehicle automation.169 This finding raises the issue of negligence and the extent to
which a human driver can be held liable for inattentiveness when operating an
automated vehicle.170 It also illustrates how potential future litigation may require the
allocation of responsibility among the manufacturer, supplier, or operator, some of
which may be addressed in advance with a contract and insurance scheme.171
B. Health Care

The health care industry is undergoing a digital transformation. Use of IoT
technologies improves medical outcomes for individual patients, and, combined with
artificial intelligence and big data, the information generated by connected
technologies can be used to develop new treatments and predict health care trends
164. Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 12; Shackelford & Russell, supra note 31, at 643.
165. See Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 12.
166. Id. at 15–16.
167. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dept. of Transp., PE 16-007, ODI Resume 1 (2017)

[hereinafter NHTSA Tesla Report], https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.
PDF; Darrell Etherington, NHTSA’s Full Final Investigation into Tesla’s Autopilot Shows 40% Crash Rate
Reduction, TechCrunch (Jan. 19, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/19/nhtsas-full-final-investigationinto-teslas-autopilot-shows-40-crash-rate-reduction/.

168. See NHTSA Tesla Report, supra note 167, at 1.
169. Driver Errors, Overreliance on Automation, Lack of Safeguards, Led to Fatal Tesla Crash, Nat’l Transp.

Safety Board, (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20170912.aspx.
Another accident, in March 2018, involved an Uber self-driving vehicle that hit and killed a pedestrian in
Arizona; NHTSA is still investigating the incident and has not determined fault, though there are early
indications that neither the driver nor the vehicle detected the individual. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber
Ordered to Take Its Self-Driving Cars Off Arizona Roads, N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/26/technology/arizona-uber-cars.html.

170. See Jones Day White Paper, supra note 105, at 16–17.
171. See id. at 16–18.
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across the larger population.172 Smart monitoring devices can assess medical
conditions like diabetes, cholesterol levels, or heart disease in real time and automate
the delivery of medicine to a patient.173 Given that these smart devices can collect
millions of pieces of information from individuals, IoT technologies can revolutionize
health care by delivering that information to medical providers and researchers, who
can analyze the data collectively to identify trends and determine where resources
can be most effectively allocated.174
Health care companies are particularly vulnerable to cybersecurity risks because
they collect, store, and maintain a treasure trove of data. These companies handle
not only the most sensitive types of personal information, such as social security,
credit card, and bank account numbers, but also health care data, which, once
disclosed, cannot be changed or canceled like a credit card or bank account number.175
The health care industry experienced more data breaches than any other critical
infrastructure sector in 2015.176
Congress established the Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force in the
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to review the cybersecurity challenges facing the health care
industry.177 The Task Force issued its report and recommendations in June 2017.178
Among the Task Force’s chief concerns is the regulatory compliance risk faced by
companies in the health care industry.179 The Task Force noted that multiple regulators
have authority within the health care space: The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) at HHS, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health

172. Daniel Newman, Top Five Digital Transformation Trends in Health Care, Forbes (Mar. 7, 2017, 8:14

AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2017/03/07/top-f ive-digital-transformationtrends-in-healthcare/#6157a75c2561.

173. Geoff Appelboom et al., Smart Wearable Body Sensors for Patient Self-Assessment and

Monitoring 3–4 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4166023/pdf/2049-325872-28.pdf; see Health Care Indus. Cybersecurity Task Force, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., Report on Improving Cybersecurity in the Health Care Industry 14 (2017), https://
www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Documents/report2017.pdf.

174. See Newman, supra note 172. For example, one company collects radiological data from millions of

x-ray, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and tomography readings taken through advanced imaging
equipment to analyze how radiologists are using the equipment and make recommendations on how to
deploy this expensive equipment more efficiently. Daugherty et al., supra note 11.

175. Health Care Indus. Cybersecurity Task Force, supra note 173. For this reason, health care data

can fetch a higher price for cybercriminals on the dark web. Id. at 15.

176. Id. at 16. The attacks increased in sophistication in 2016 and 2017 with a wave of ransomware attacks

on hospitals and other health-care related organizations. Id.; Elizabeth Snell, Healthcare Ransomware
Attacks Contribute to 2017 Top Data Breaches, HealthITSecurity (Dec. 13, 2017), https://
healthitsecurity.com/news/healthcare-ransomware-attacks-contribute-to-2017-top-data-breaches.

177. Health Care Indus. Cybersecurity Task Force, supra note 173, at 1.
178. Id. at iii.
179. Id. at 11–12.
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Information Technology at HHS, among others.180 This may create overlapping and
possibly conflicting legal and technical burdens on health care companies.181
Privacy and security of health data are regulated generally by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), as amended by the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, which protects the
storage, handling, and transmission of individuals’ protected health information
(PHI).182 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule governs the permissible use and disclosure of PHI
and grants individuals certain rights to access and correct their healthcare records,183
while the Security Rule requires entities to safeguard electronic PHI with appropriate
policies and procedures to protect PHI from unauthorized access or disclosure.184
The OCR has an active enforcement history of imposing corrective measures or a
civil monetary penalty, or both, on companies that do not fulfill their obligations
under these rules.185 But HIPAA only applies to “covered entities,” typically, health
care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses,186 and their contractors,
called business associates.187 Certain entities in the industrial IoT space may not be
subject to HIPAA, such as suppliers or equipment manufacturers,188 creating
different regulatory burdens for different IoT companies in the health care space.
Companies also face compliance risk with the FDA, which has incorporated
cybersecurity recommendations for medical devices into a series of guidance issued
over the last few years. Medical devices present some of the greatest cybersecurity risks
because they hold a large amount of sensitive patient health information and interact
physically with the patient, creating potential for injury to the patient if the device
malfunctions. On October 2, 2014, the FDA released guidance called “Content of
Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices”
advising medical device manufacturers to develop a set of cybersecurity controls to

180. Id. at 11.
181. Id. at 11–12.
182. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 18, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 230 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

183. HIPAA Privacy Rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2018).
184. HIPAA Security Rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–164.318 (2018).
185. See Enforcement Highlights, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Services, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-

professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/enforcement-highlights/index.html?language=en (last
updated Mar. 6, 2018).

186. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
187. Id. A “business associate” is generally someone who “creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected

health information for a [regulated] function or activity . . . [o]n behalf of such covered entity or of an
organized health care arrangement.” Id.

188. See Health Care Indus. Cybersecurity Task Force, supra note 173, at 12.
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ensure functionality and safety of the devices.189 The guidance recommends that
manufacturers incorporate cybersecurity safeguards during the design and development
of the medical device, taking into account the need to balance cybersecurity with the
usability of the device.190
The FDA also issued guidance on September 6, 2017 called “Design
Considerations and Pre-market Submission Recommendations for Interoperable
Medical Devices” addressing the cybersecurity of interoperable medical devices.191
The FDA issued the guidance because “electronic medical devices are increasingly
connected to each other and to other technology, [and] the ability of these connected
systems to safely and effectively exchange and use the information that has been
exchanged becomes increasingly important.”192 The FDA recognized that errors or
interference with interoperability could cause inaccurate, untimely, or misleading
information that could lead to patient injury or possibly death, such as if a device was
to transmit the wrong amount of medicine to a patient.193 The FDA recommends
that manufacturers perform a risk analysis and testing to determine the risks
associated with interoperability to the device, the network, and other interfaced
devices so that they may implement appropriate security features.194
In addition, the Medical Device Cybersecurity Act of 2017 was introduced in the
Senate in July 2017 to protect patient safety by proposing a cyber report card for
devices, requiring cybersecurity risk assessments, mandating product testing prior to
sale, and improving remote access protection for devices, among other measures.195
Though no action has been taken on the bill yet, it has received support from the
health care industry.196

189. Ctr. For Devices & Radiological Health & Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research,

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of
Cybersecurity in Medical Devices 3 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf.

190. Id. at 4. In particular, manufacturers should consider implementing features such as authentication of

users, automatic timed methods to terminate sessions, secure data transfer mechanisms, features to
detect security compromises, and features to protect critical functionality of the device in the event of a
cybersecurity compromise. Id. at 5.

191. Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health & Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, U.S.

Food & Drug Admin., Design Considerations and Pre-Market Submission Recommendations
for Interoperable Medical Devices 1 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482649.pdf.

192. Id.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 8.
195. S. 1656, 115th Cong. (2017).
196. Elizabeth Snell, Medical Device Cybersecurity Act Draws Industry Support, HealthITSecurity.com

(Aug. 4, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/medical-device-cybersecurity-act-draws-industrysupport.
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In light of this potential legislation and the regulatory push from the FDA,
manufacturers should improve the cybersecurity of their medical devices proactively.197
For example, manufacturers are already permitted to update the cybersecurity of
medical devices without FDA review or approval.198 Companies that incorporate offthe-shelf software in their medical devices are responsible for ensuring the security
and the effective performance of those devices, so companies should test the
functionality of their software and update as needed.199
Contracting risk is another challenge facing industrial IoT companies in the
health care industry. Health care companies making use of the industrial IoT rely on
cloud services for data storage, industrial health software solutions, and computing
services.200 In recognition of the widespread use of cloud computing solutions in the
healthcare space, HHS issued guidance in October 2016 clarifying that a cloud
service provider is a business associate under HIPAA and that a covered entity must
enter into a business associate agreement with a cloud service provider involved in
creating, receiving, maintaining, or transmitting electronic PHI that complies with
the Security Rule.201 A cloud service provider must comply with these requirements
even if it stores encrypted data and does not have the decryption key.202 HHS also
recommends a service level agreement with the cloud service provider to specify
business expectations pertinent to HIPAA compliance, such as system availability,
data backup and recovery, the manner in which data will be provided to the covered
entity upon termination of the agreement, a delineation of responsibility for security,
and limits on data retention and disclosure.203
These contracting guidelines have implications for cloud service providers who
may not even be aware they are handling health care information.204 The guidelines
apply to cloud service providers that do not have actual or constructive knowledge
that a covered entity or business associate is using its services to create, receive,
maintain, or transmit electronic PHI.205 HIPAA provides these services providers
197. FDA Fact Sheet: The FDA’s Role in Medical Device Cybersecurity, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://

www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM544684.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).

198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See infra notes 201.
201. Guidance on HIPAA & Cloud Computing, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Services, https://www.hhs.gov/

hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/cloud-computing/index.html (last updated June 16, 2017). The
agreement should establish the permitted uses and disclosures of electronic PHI and require the
business associate to implement appropriate safeguards for electronic PHI, report to the covered entity
any unauthorized use or disclosure of electronic PHI, make available its internal practices, books, and
records related to the use or disclosure of electronic PHI, and destroy or return to the covered entity all
PHI at the termination of the contract, among other requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2) (2018).

202. Guidance on HIPAA & Cloud Computing, supra note 201.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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with an affirmative defense, as long as the provider corrects its non-compliance with
HIPAA within thirty days.206
C. Utilities

One of the most sensitive applications of the industrial IoT is in utilities. Utilities
such as power grids, water treatment plants, chemical facilities, and nuclear plants
are critical infrastructure that manage the physical world, so interference with IoT
technologies at these locations could place public health and safety at risk.207 Despite
the risks, industrial IoT technologies have great potential to modernize utilities that
are running inefficiently and operating at capacity with aging legacy equipment, and
may not otherwise meet future needs.208 The application of IoT to utilities will even
benefit municipalities in developing smart cities.209
Utilities face challenges as they incorporate new technologies. For example, electric
utilities operate across a grid—a network of transmission lines, substations, and
transformers that delivers electricity from a power plant to customers.210 The “smart
grid” refers to the two-way communication between a utility and customers using
controls, automation, digital technologies, and IoT technologies to ensure more
efficient transmission of electricity at a lower cost.211 As utilities continue transitioning
toward more digitalization and interconnected networks, the security risks facing these
utilities will continue to grow.212
A utility is more likely to face enforcement risk than litigation risk arising out of
a security incident. Historically, customers or other end users have found it difficult
to state a claim for negligence related to interrupted services.213 Courts have found
206. Id.
207. Manyika et al., supra note 14, at 105; see, e.g., Zetter, supra note 29.
208. Christopher Bosch, Note, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and Privacy Through

Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1349, 1351 (2014); U.S. Dep’t
of Energy, What Is the Smart Grid?, Smartgrid.gov, https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/
smart_grid.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

209. See Intelligent Urban Water Supply Testbed, Indus. Internet Consortium, http://www.iiconsortium.

org/intelligent-urban-water-supply.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). Municipalities can apply connected
technologies to water supply assets, such as pressurizing pumps or water meters, to gather data about
water usage, quality, and leakage to ensure equitable water distribution and consumption during peak
usage hours and water supply shortages. Id.

210. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 208.
211. Id.; Abrenio et al., supra note 28, at 7.
212. Nadya Bartol et al., The Bos. Consulting Grp., Ensuring Cybersecurity in the Electric

Utility Industry 1 (2017), http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Ensuring-Cybersecurity-in-theElectric-Utility-Industry-Aug-2017_tcm9-167980.pdf. Utilities have experienced cyberattacks before,
including the highly publicized Stuxnet attack. Bosch, supra note 208, at 1363, 1366. The Stuxnet
attack infiltrated the command and control software for Iran’s nuclear program, causing the program’s
centrifuges to self-destruct and resulting in physical damage. Abrenio et al., supra note 28, at 11; see also
Zetter, supra note 29 (providing an overview of the Stuxnet cyberattack).

213. Abrenio et al., supra note 28, at 30.
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that the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC)214 standards
create a duty between the government and utilities, but that the duty does not run to
customers.215 Federal regulation applies to the wholesale market while state utility
commissions regulate retail power distribution.216 Even when a utility contracts with
a customer to provide a service for general purposes, such as the provision of
electricity or water, it still may be insufficient under state law to create a duty to the
customer for the interruption of the service.217
Utility companies face vendor management risk given the complexity of their
supply chains. For example, an electric utility may potentially have hundreds of
vendors involved in constructing and maintaining the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electricity. 218 Supply chain management is critical to ensuring the
cybersecurity of utilities.219 Utilities have experienced an exponential growth in the
use of IoT technologies developed by third parties.220 A vulnerability in any of these
devices places the rest of the network at risk, 221 and the risks would be compounded
if vendors’ technology or equipment are used at more than one plant.222 Utilities
should develop supply chain risk management programs to ensure that IoT
technologies are designed and implemented securely, which may include establishing
standardized security requirements, vendor assessments, and site visits.223
214. NERC is a not-for-profit international regulatory authority overseen by the U.S. Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission. About NERC, N. Am. Electric Reliability Corp., http://www.nerc.com/
AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). NERC is currently the only regulatory body
with mandatory cybersecurity standards. Mission Support Center Analysis Report, supra note 45, at 23.
NERC updated the standards governing electric utilities and operators, called the Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) Standards, which include access controls to cyber assets, electronic security perimeters,
physical security, threat monitoring, personnel training, incident response reporting and planning, and
recovery planning. Id.; CIP Standards, N. Am. Electric Reliability Corp., http://www.nerc.com/
pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). Given that NERC only recently
incorporated cybersecurity standards into the CIP standards, there has been little case law or
enforcement actions directly dealing with a utility’s liability for failing to adhere to the cybersecurity
standards. Abrenio, supra note 28, at 29. However, NERC has imposed penalties on entities for failing
to comply with other aspects of the CIP standards, and it is reasonable to expect NERC to do the same
with cybersecurity standards. See id.

215. Waldon v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 642 F. App’x 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2016); Abrenio et al., supra note 28, at

28–29. Courts have found that, in the absence of a contract with the utility, NERC’s reliability standards
do not give rise to a claim for negligence per se under state law. Waldon, 642 F. App’x at 669 (citing
White v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).

216. Waldon, 642 F. App’x at 669.
217. White, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435–36.
218. Mission Support Center Analysis Report, supra note 45, at 15.
219. Bartol et al., supra note 211, at 4.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2.
222. Mission Support Center Analysis Report, supra note 45, at 24.
223. Bartol et al., supra note 211, at 6.
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VI. EUROPEAN REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

Europe has historically treated the protection of personal data as a fundamental
right 224 and is in the process of implementing an aggressive regulatory approach to
new technologies that capture the personal data of individuals residing in the
European Union. These regulations will apply to the industrial IoT. While some
U.S. regulators have delayed regulation to avoid stifling innovation for early stage
technologies, 225 Europe has started down the path of using regulation to shape
privacy and security at the outset of the IoT. These uncoordinated, and at times
conflicting, approaches may create compliance difficulties and increase the costs for
companies that operate across borders.
One of the most important European regulatory proposals on the horizon is the
ePrivacy Regulation.226 The ePrivacy Regulation would replace the current ePrivacy
Directive, which was first enacted in 2002 and last revised in 2009 to protect the
privacy and confidentiality of users of electronic communication services, namely
through internet service and broadband providers.227 Since the Directive has not kept
pace with technological developments in electronic communication, the proposed
ePrivacy Regulation would expand the coverage of the Directive and convert it to a
regulation that becomes immediately enforceable in all member states. The ePrivacy
Regulation would apply to “Over-the-Top” (OTT) communications services that are
provided through internet-based services—such as web-based email or instant
messaging services—that are not presently covered under the Directive. 228 The
ePrivacy Regulation would require companies to keep electronic communications
data confidential and prohibit any interference with the data, such as by “listening,
tapping, storing, monitoring, scanning or other kinds of interception, surveillance or
processing . . . by persons other than the end-users,” except under certain
circumstances, such as with consent of the end-user.229
The ePrivacy Regulation would even have implications for the industrial IoT.230
European regulators recognize the growing importance of connected devices and
224. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 51, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 65 (EU), recital 1.
225. FTC IoT Guidance, supra note 80, at 48–49.
226. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Respect for

Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10,
2017) [hereinafter ePrivacy Regulation], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX%3A52017PC0010.

227. Id. at recital 1.1; Council Directive 2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC).
228. See ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 226, at recital 1.1.
229. ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 226, at arts. 5–6.
230. The potential scope of the ePrivacy Regulation is vast because it applies to any company providing

electronic communications services to end-users in the EU, the use of such services, and the protection
of information related to the terminal equipment of end-users in the EU. Id. at art. 3. Critics worry that
it has the potential to apply to any business that communicates digitally with its customers. Jennifer
Baker, European Commission Proposes Formal ePrivacy Regulation, IAPP: Privacy Tracker (Jan. 10,
2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/european-commission-proposes-formal-eprivacy-regulation/.
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machines as a form of electronic communication and “want to promote a trusted and
secure Internet of Things in the digital single market.”231 For this reason, regulators
contemplate that the ePrivacy Regulation would apply to machine-to-machine
communications over an electronic communications network. 232 However, the
ePrivacy Regulation as currently proposed applies only to electronic communications
services that are available to the public, not closed groups of end-users.233 This means
that the ePrivacy Regulation may not apply in certain industrial environments that
are not designed to interact with the public, such as a manufacturing facility or an oil
rig. But when designed to interact with the terminal equipment of an end user, such
as a connected vehicle or smart medical device, other industrial IoT applications
would be subject to the ePrivacy Regulation.
The high penalties proposed under the ePrivacy Regulation would raise the
stakes for noncompliance. A company that violates the ePrivacy Regulation could be
subject to administrative fines of up to ten million euros or up to two percent of
annual worldwide turnover.234 If the company violates the provisions of the ePrivacy
Regulation related to confidentiality of communications, processing of electronic
communications data, or time limits for erasure, the administrative fines could reach
twenty million euros or up to four percent of annual worldwide turnover.235
In addition to the ePrivacy Regulation, the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) goes into effect on May 25, 2018, 236 which is expected to affect
companies using IoT technologies to collect and analyze data from end users.237 The
GDPR requires a company to have a lawful basis to process personal data238 and
grants enhanced rights to individuals, 239 such as the right to object to automated
decision-making.240 The GDPR also requires companies to implement technical and
organizational measures to protect personal data collected through industrial IoT
technologies.241
Complying with the GDPR is particularly difficult in an industrial IoT context.
European regulators recognize the difficulties of complying with traditional notions
of notice and consent when information is being gathered in less conventional ways
231. ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 226, at recital 12.
232. Id. at recital 12.
233. Id. at recital 13.
234. Id. at arts. 23.
235. Id.
236. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 51, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 65 (EU) [hereinafter “GDPR”].
237. Adam Finlay & Ruairi Madigan, GDPR and the Internet of Things: 5 Things You Need to Know, Lexology

(May 26, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ba0b0d12-bae3-4e93-b83285c15620b877.

238. GDPR, supra note 236, at arts. 6–7.
239. Id. at arts. 15–22.
240. Id. at art. 22.
241. Id. at art. 32.
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through novel technologies.242 Due to the growing significance of IoT technology to
the digital economy, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, an advisory body
made up of representatives of national Data Protection Authorities from each EU
member state, issued an opinion in 2014 with recommendations for how companies
using IoT technologies could meet notice and consent requirements under EU
regulations.243 For example, the Working Party recommended that IoT stakeholders
aggregate data and delete raw data collected by IoT devices shortly after extracting it
and that deletion should occur at the nearest point of collection of the data. 244
A failure to comply with the GDPR carries potentially hefty fines of up to ten
million euros or up to two percent of annual worldwide turnover.245 The fine increases
to twenty million euros or up to four percent of worldwide annual turnover for
violations of processing principles or individuals’ rights to object to the processing of
their data.246 Companies need to be aware that they are required to comply with the
GDPR if their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to
individuals in the EU or to monitoring the behavior of individuals if that behavior
occurs within the EU, even if they are not established in the EU. 247
VII. CONCLUSION

Use of data to improve industrial performance promises to bring fundamental
changes to the operation of industry. The industrial IoT holds enormous potential to
improve organizational processes, create efficiencies, generate revenues, and promote
economic growth. 248 To achieve the full promise of the industrial IoT, industrial
stakeholders, developers, and regulators must come together to overcome legal,
regulatory, and technical hurdles.
As the landscape for the industrial IoT continues to develop, so do the operational
risks, uncertainties, and liabilities faced by industrial companies. As more companies
integrate industrial IoT technologies into their existing operations, they will grapple
with the security, intellectual property, licensing, and litigation risks raised in this
article. With no new U.S. laws or regulations governing the industrial IoT expected
on the horizon, 249 these companies will have to address emerging security concerns
and legal issues related to the industrial IoT with little guidance or precedent.
242. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the Internet

of Things, 14/EN WP 223, at 7 (Sept. 16, 2014).

243. Id. at 14, 21. The European Data Protection Board will replace the Article 29 Working Party in May

2018 when the GDPR goes in effect. European Data Prot. Supervisor, Annual Report 2017, at 16
(2018).
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248. See Paez & La Marca, supra note 1, at 31.
249. See FTC IoT Guidance, supra note 80, at 48–49.

247

